Abstract. A general theory for constructing linear secret sharing schemes over a finite field Fq from toric varieties is introduced. The number of players can be as large as (q − 1) r − 1 for r ≥ 1. We present general methods for obtaining the reconstruction and privacy thresholds as well as conditions for multiplication on the associated secret sharing schemes.
1. Introduction 1.1. Secret sharing. Secret sharing schemes were introduced in [3] and [17] and provide a method to split a secret into several pieces of information shares such that any large enough subset of the shares determines the secret, while any small subset of shares provides no information on the secret.
Secret sharing schemes have found applications in cryptography, when the schemes have certain algebraic properties. Linear secret sharing schemes (LSSS) are schemes where the secrets s and their associated shares (a 1 , . . . , a n ) are elements in a vector space over some finite ground field F q . The schemes are called ideal if the secret s and the shares a i are elements in that ground field F q . Specifically, if s,s ∈ F q are two secrets with share vectors (a 1 , . . . a n ), (ã 1 , . . .ã n ) ∈ F n q , then the share vector of the secret s+λs ∈ F q is (a 1 +λã 1 , . . . , a n +λã n ) ∈ F n q for any λ ∈ F q .
The reconstruction threshold of the linear secret sharing scheme is the smallest integer r such that any set of at least r of the shares a 1 , . . . , a n determines the secret s. The privacy threshold is the largest integer t such that no set of t (or fewer) elements of the shares a 1 , . . . , a n determines the secret s. The scheme is said to have t-privacy.
An ideal linear secret sharing scheme is said to have multiplication if the product of the shares determines the product of the secrets. It has t-strong multiplication if it has t-privacy and has multiplication for any subset of n − t shares obtained by removing any t shares.
The properties of multiplication was introduced in [8] . Such schemes with multiplication can be utilized in the domain of multiparty computation (MPC), see [5] , [2] , [9] and [4] .
1.2. Toric varieties and secret sharing. In [11] , [12] and [13] we developed methods to construct linear error correcting codes from toric varieties and derived the code parameters using the cohomology and the intersection theory on toric varieties. In [14] we utilized the method and the results to construct quantum codes.
This method of toric varieties also applies to construct algebraic geometric ideal secret sharing schemes (LSSS) defined over a finite ground field F q with q elements. In a certain sense our construction resembles that of [6] , where LSSS schemes were constructed from algebraic curves. However, the methods fo obtaining the parameters are completely different.
The linear secret sharing schemes we obtain are ideal and the number of players can be of the magnitude q r for any positive integer r. They are obtained by evaluating certain rational functions in F q -rational points on toric varieties. The thresholds and conditions for strong multiplication are derived from estimates on the maximal number of zeroes of rational functions obtained via the cohomology and intersection theory on the underlying toric variety. In particular, we focus on toric surfaces.
We present examples of linear secret sharing schemes which are quasi-threshold and have strong multiplication [8] with respect to certain adversary structures.
Specifically, for any pair of integers a, b with 0 ≤ b ≤ a ≤ q − 2, we produce linear secret sharing schemes with (q − 1) 2 − 1 players which are quasi-threshold, i.e., the reconstruction threshold is at most 1 + (q − 1) 2 − (q − 1 − a) and the privacy threshold is at least b−1. The schemes have t-strong multiplication with respect to the threshold adversary structure if
For the general theory of toric varieties we refer to [16] , [10] and [7] .
2. Preliminaries 2.1. Linear Secret Sharing Schemes. This section presents basic definitions and concepts pertaining to linear secret sharing schemes as introduced in [8] and [6] . Let F q be a finite field with q elements. An ideal linear secret sharing scheme M over a finite field F q on a set P of n players is given by a positive integer e, a sequence V 1 , . . . V n of 1-dimensional linear subspaces V i ⊂ F e q and a non-zero vector u ∈ F e q . An adversary structure A, for a secret sharing scheme M on the set of players P, is a collection of subsets of P with the property that subsets of sets in A are also sets in A. In particular, the adversary structure A t,n consists of all the subsets of size at most t of the set P of n players, and the access structure Γ r,n consists of all the subsets of size at least r of the set P of n players.
For any subset A of players, let V A = i∈A V i be the F q -subspace spanned by all the V i for i ∈ A. The access structure Γ(M) of M consists of all the subsets B of players with u ∈ V B , and A(M) consists of all the other subsets A of players, i.e A / ∈ Γ(M). A linear secret sharing scheme M is said to reject a given adversary structure A, if A ⊆ A(M). Therefore A ∈ A(M) if and only if there is a linear map from F e q to F q vanishing on V A , while non-zero on u. The scheme M works as follows. For i = 1, . . . n, let v i ∈ V i be bases for the 1-dimensional vector spaces. Let s ∈ F q be a secret. Choose at random a linear morphism φ : F e q → F q , subject to the condition φ(u) = s, and let a i = φ(v i ) for i = 1, . . . , n be the shares
Then
-the shares {a i = φ(v i )} i∈A determine the secret s = φ(u) uniquely if and only if A ∈ Γ(M), -the shares {a i = φ(v i )} i∈A reveal no information on the secret s = φ(u), i.e., when A ∈ A(M). Definition 1. Let M be a linear secret sharing scheme.
The reconstruction threshold of M is the smallest integer r such that any set of at least r of the shares a 1 , . . . , a n determine the secret s, i.e., Γ r,n ⊆ Γ(M).
The privacy threshold is the largest integer t such that no set of t (or less) elements of the shares a 1 , . . . , a n determine the secret s, i.e., A t,n ⊆ A(M). The scheme M is said to have t-privacy. Definition 2. An ideal linear secret sharing scheme M has the strong multiplication property with respect to an adversary structure A if the following holds.
1. M rejects the adversary structure A . 2. Given two secrets s ands. For each A ∈ A, the products a i ·ã i of all the shares of the players i / ∈ A determine the product s ·s of the two secrets.
Linear secret sharing schemes on tori
Let M ≃ Z r be a free Z-module of rank r over the integers Z.
. . , u r ) ∈ U } . This is a F q -vectorspace of dimension equal to the number of elements in U .
Let T (F q ) = (F * q ) r be the F q -rational points on the torus and let S ⊆ T (F q ) be any subset. The linear map that evaluates elements in F q < U > at all the points in S is denoted by π S :
In this notation π {P } (f ) = f (P ).
Definition 3. Let S ⊆ T (F q ) be any subset such that P 0 ∈ S. The linear secret sharing schemes (LSSS) M(U ) with support S and n = |S| − 1 players is obtained as follows:
• Let s 0 ∈ F q be a secret value. Select f ∈ F q < U > at random such that π {P0} (f ) = f (P 0 ) = s 0 .
• Define the n shares as
The main objectives are to study privacy, reconstruction of the secret from the shares and the property strong multiplication of the scheme as introduced in Definition 1 and Definition 2.
In order to present the general theory for the linear secret sharing schemes M(U ) above, we make some preliminary definitions and observations. 3.0.1. Translation. Let U ⊆ M be a subset, let v ∈ M and consider the translate v + U := {v + u| u ∈ U } ⊆ M .
Lemma 4. Translation induces an isomorphism of vectorspaces
We have that i) The evaluations of π T (Fq) (f ) and π T (Fq) (f v ) have the same number of zeroes on T (F q ). ii) The minimal number of zeros on T (F q ) of evaluations of elements in F q < U > and F q < v + U > are the same. iii) For v = (v 1 , . . . , v r ) with v i divisible by q − 1, the evaluations π S (f ) and π S (f v ) are the same for any subset S of T (F q ).
Proof. The first claim is obvious, the inverse morphism is obtained by multiplication with X −v . Evaluating at a point P = (ξ i1 , . . . , ξ ir ) ∈ T (F q ), where ξ ∈ F * q is a primitive element, we obtain for
Therefore f (P ) = 0 if and only if f v (P ) = 0. In particular we have that f and f v have the same number of zeroes in T (F q ).
Under the assumption of iii), X v evaluates to 1, and the conclusion follows.
An immediate consequence of iii) above is the following.
Corollary 5. Let U ⊆ M be a subset and let
The opposite maps the monomial X u to X −u and induces by linearity an isomorphism of vectorspaces
, we have the inner product
Lemma 6. Let f, g ∈ F q < M > and assume f =ĝ, then
Proof.
ii) The orthogonal complement to
For any fixed i 2 , . . . , i r , we have
the first factor on the right hand side being zero, because u 1 + v 1 = 0. Therefore
As all elements in the basis of π T (Fq) (F q < U >) is orthogonal to all elements in the basis of π T (Fq) (F q < −H \ −U >), the claim in i) follows by linearity. The claim in ii) also follows by linearity because the dimensions of π T (Fq) (F q < U >) and π T (Fq) (F q < −H \ −U >) add up to the dimension of the ambient space F
r be the F q -rational points on the torus and let P 0 ∈ T (F q ) be a fixed point.
The linear secret sharing schemes M(U ) of Definition 3 is constructed evaluating elements in F q < U > at all the points on T (F q )
Specifically, the secret s ∈ F q has the n = (q − 1) r − 1 shares
Let r(U ) and t(U ) be the reconstruction and privacy thresholds of M(U ) as defined in Definition 1. Then
for some f ∈ F q < U > and for some g ∈ F q < −H \ −U > , where
Proof. Let A ⊆ T (F q ) with
for all f ∈ F q < U >. Then the linear morphism
has trivial kernel and therefore injective; consequently A belongs to the access structure Γ(M(U )) of the scheme
Consider the morphism
with π P0 (y) = 1 and π T (Fq)\(A∪{P0}) (y) = 0 has |T (F q ) \ A| − 1 zeros. This number is strictly larger than the maximal number of zeros of
Choose a non-zero vector x ∈ F |T (Fq)\A| q orthogonal to
such that x ⋆ y = 0. This implies that π {P0} (x) = 0, and we can assume that π {P0} (x) = 1. Define by extension
is an isomorphism, and c = π T (Fq) (g) for some g ∈ F q < H >. Therefore g ∈ F q < U > by orthogonality as shown in Corollary 7.
By construction π P0 (g) = 1 and π A (g) = 0, and therefore A belongs to the access structure A(M(U )) of the scheme M(U ) by definition.
The linear secret sharing schemes M(U ) of Definition 3 and Theorem 8, with n = (q − 1) r − 1 players, has strong multiplication with respect to A t,n for t ≤ t(U ), where t(U ) is the adversary threshold of M(U ), if
Consider the linear morphism
evaluating at the points in B.
By assumption h ∈ F q < U + U > can have at most n − t − 1 < n − t = |B| zeros, therefore h can't vanish identically on B, and we conclude that π B is injective. Consequently the products f (P ) · g(P ) of the shares P ∈ B determine the product of the secrets f (P 0 )·g(P 0 ), and the scheme has strong multiplication by definition.
The method of toric varieties
We will from now on focus on the 2-dimensional lattice M ≃ Z 2 and assume that U = M ∩ consists of the integral points of a 2-dimensional integral convex polytope in M R = M ⊗ Z R. We will study the associated linear secret sharing scheme M(U ) of Definition 3. The same theory applies for higher dimension.
In this case the convex polytope gives rise to an algebraic surface and we use intersection theory on that surface to bound the number of zeros of the evaluations
of elements in F q < U > at all the points of S ⊆ T (F q ).
For the general theory of toric varieties we refer to [10] and [16] . Here we will recollect some of the theory for toric surfaces. Let
Given a 2-dimensional integral convex polytope in M R . The support function h : N R → R is defined as h (n) := inf{< m, n > | m ∈ } and the polytope can be reconstructed from the support function
The support function h is piecewise linear in the sense that N R is the union of a non-empty finite collection of strongly convex polyhedral cones in N R such that h is linear on each cone.
A fan is a collection ∆ of strongly convex polyhedral cones in N R such that every face of σ ∈ ∆ is contained in ∆ and σ ∩ σ ′ ∈ ∆ for all σ, σ ′ ∈ ∆. The normal fan ∆ is the coarsest fan such that h is linear on each σ ∈ ∆, i.e. for all σ ∈ ∆ there exists
The 1-dimensional cones ρ ∈ ∆ are generated by unique primitive elements n(ρ) ∈ N ∩ ρ such that ρ = R ≥0 n(ρ).
Upon refinement of the normal fan, we can assume that two successive pairs of n(ρ)'s generate the lattice and we obtain the refined normal fan.
Let k = F q be an algebraic closure of F q . The 2-dimensional algebraic torus T N ≃ k * × k * is defined by T N := Hom Z (M, k * ). The multiplicative character e(m) for m ∈ M is the homomorphism
Specifically, if {n 1 , n 2 } and {m 1 , m 2 } are dual Z-bases of N and M and we denote u j := e(m j ), j = 1, 2, then we have an isomorphism
The toric surface X associated to the fan ∆ of is
where U σ is the k-valued points of the affine scheme Spec(k[S σ ]), i.e. morphisms u : S σ → k with u(0) = 1 and
The toric surface X is irreducible, non-singular and complete under the assumption that we are working with the refined normal fan. If σ, τ ∈ ∆ and τ is a face of σ, then U τ is an open subset of U σ . Obviously S 0 = M and U 0 = T N such that the algebraic torus T N is an open subset of X .
T N acts algebraically on X . On u ∈ U σ the action of t ∈ T N is obtained as (tu)(m) := t(m)u(m) for m ∈ S σ , such that tu ∈ U σ and U σ is T N -stable. The orbits of this action are in one-to-one correspondance with ∆. For each σ ∈ ∆ let orb(σ) := {u : M ∩ σ → k * |u is a group homomorphism} .
Then orb(σ) is a T N -orbit in X . Define V (σ) to be the closure of orb(σ) in X .
A ∆-linear support function h gives rise to a polytope as in (9) and an associated Cartier divisor
where ∆(1) consists of the 1-dimensional cones in ∆. In particular
Lemma 10. Let h be a ∆-linear support function with associated convex polytope as in (9) 
4.2.
Intersection theory on a toric surface. For a ∆-linear support function h and a 1-dimensional cone ρ ∈ ∆(1), we will determine the intersection number (D h ; V (ρ)) between the Cartier divisor D h of (5) and V (ρ)) = P 1 . This number is obtained in [16, Lemma 2.11]. The 1-dimensional cone ρ ∈ ∆(1) is the common face of two 2-dimensional cones σ ′ , σ ′′ ∈ ∆(2). Choose primitive elements n ′ , n ′′ ∈ N such that
In the 2-dimensional non-singular case let n(ρ) be a primitive generator for the 1-dimensional cone ρ. There exists an integer a such that
is itself a Cartier divisor and the above gives the self-intersection number (V (ρ); V (ρ)) = a .
More generally the self-intersection number of a Cartier divisor D h is obtained in [16, Prop. 2.10].
Lemma 12. Let D h be a Cartier divisor and let h be the polytope associated to h as in (9) . Then
where vol 2 is the normalized Lesbesgue-measure.
4.3.
The support of the secret sharing schemes. The secret sharing scheme M(U ) of Definition 3 is obtained by evaluating certain rational functions in a suitable subset S of F q -rational points, which in certain cases is contained in the intersection of two ample divisors on the toric varieties X.
Remark 13. For i = 1, 2, let I i , J i ⊆ F * q with I 1 ∩ J 2 = I 2 ∩ J 1 = ∅, and introduce the two rational functions
where the integer exponents satisfy n 1,ψ ≥ 1 and n 2,ψ ≥ 1. For i = 1, 2, let D i = (F i ) 0 be their divisor of zeroes and let |D i | be their support. It is important to note that the supports are independent of the choice of the exponents n 1,ψ ≥ 1 and n 2,ψ ≥ 1.
The support set S of the linear secret sharing scheme M(U ) can in certain cases be realized as a subset of
q is realized as the support of the intersection of two divisors in many different ways, namely one for each choice of the exponents n 1,ψ ≥ 1 and n 2,ψ ≥ 1.
4.4.
Linear secret sharing schemes from convex polytopes and evaluations on toric varieties. In Definition 3 we assume that U ⊆ M is the lattice points of an integral convex polytope , i.e. U = ∩ M .
We exhibit the linear secret sharing schemes M(U ) of Definition 3 as evaluations of rational functions in F q -rational points on the toric variety X associated to the normal fan of .
Frob be the rational functions in H 0 (X, O X (D )), that are invariant under the action of the Frobenius, i.e. functions that are F q -linear combinations of the functions e(m) in (4). From Lemma 10
Frob . Evaluating in all points of T (F q ), we obtain the evaluations
as in (4).
2 be a set of distinct F q -rational points. The linear secret sharing scheme M(U ) was constructed as follows. Let s 0 ∈ F q be a secret value. Select at random
Frob such that f (P 0 ) = s 0 and define the shares
To estimate the privacy and adversary thresholds and assure strong multiplication, we have according to Theorem 8 and Theorem 9 to bound the number of points, where the rational functions in F q < V > evaluates to zero for various sets V .
Assume the support set S of M(U ) of Definition 3 is stratified by the intersections with the zeros of e(m 1 )−ψ, where ψ ∈ I 1 ∪ I 2 ⊆ F * q as in Remark 13. A rational function f can either vanish identically on a stratum or have a finite number of zeroes along the stratum.
Identically vanishing.
Assume that f is identically zero along precisely a of these strata. As e(m 1 ) − ψ and e(m 1 ) have the same divisors of poles, they have equivalent divisors of zeroes, so
Depending on the polytope this gives an upper bound for the number a, using Lemma 10.
4.4.2.
Vanishing in a finite number of points. On any of the #I 1 ∪ #I 2 − a other strata the number of zeroes of f is according to [15] at most the intersection number
This number can be calculated using Lemma 11 and Lemma 12.
The above gives a method constructing toric codes from surfaces and obtain their precise parameters, this was done by the author in various cases in [11] , [12] and [13] .
Secret Sharing Schemes with (q − 1)
2 − 1 players over F q Let X be the toric variety associated to the normal fan of the integral convex polytope with corresponding support function h and Cartier Divisor D h .
Let U = M ∩ be the lattice points in and let M(U ) be the linear secret sharing scheme with support S = T (F q ) as defined in Definition 3. Figure 1 and with refined normal fan depicted in Figure 2 . The related toric surface is called a Hirzebruch surface. Let U = M ∩ be the lattice points in .
We have the following primitive generators for the 1-dimensional cones
Let σ 1 be the cone generated by n(ρ 1 ) and n(ρ 2 ), σ 2 be the cone generated by n(ρ 2 ) and n(ρ 3 ) , σ 3 the cone generated by n(ρ 3 ) and n(ρ 4 ) and σ 4 the cone generated by n(ρ 4 ) and n(ρ 1 ).
The support function is:
For all pairs of 1-dimensional cones ρ i , ρ j ∈ ∆(1), i = 1, . . . , 4, the intersection numbers (V (ρ i ); V (ρ j )) are determined by the methods of 4.2 and the results are presented in Table 1 .
From the Hirzebruch surfaces with I 1 = J 2 = F * q × F * q and I 2 = J 1 = ∅ in the notation of Remark 13, we obtain using the above method the following result.
Then the number of lattice points in ) is
The maximal number of zeros of a function f ∈ F q < U > on T (F q ) is precisely
and the reconstruction threshold r(U ) of the secret sharing scheme M(U ) is
Proof. The first claim is trivial. As for the second let m 1 = (1, 0). The F q -rational points of T ≃ F q * × F q * belong to the q − 1 lines on X given by
Assume that f is zero along precisely a of these lines. As e(m 1 ) − η and e(m 1 ) have the same divisors of poles, they have equivalent divisors of zeroes, so
This implies that a ≤ d according to Lemma 10. On any of the other q − 1 − a lines the number of zeroes of f is according to the discussion above at most the intersection number (D h − a(div(e(m 1 ))) 0 ; (div(e(m 1 ))) 0 ). This number can be calculated using Lemma 11 and Lemma 12. and is easily determined using the intersection table above and the fact that (div(e(m 1 ))) 0 = V (ρ 1 ) + rV (ρ 4 ).
We get (D h − a(div(e(m 1 ))) 0 ; (div(e(m 1 ))) 0 ) = e + (d − a)r. As 0 ≤ a ≤ d, we conclude the total number of zeroes for f is at most Table 1 . The intersection numbers for the four 1-dimensional cones of the fan of the Hirzebruch surface consequently, we have, according to Theorem 8, the inequality
To obtain equality in (8), we exhibit functions with the maximal number of zeros on T (F q ). Let b 1 , . . . , b e+rd ∈ F * q be pairwise different elements. The function
Frob evaluates to zero in the (q − 1)(e + rd) points (x, b j ), x ∈ F * q , j = 1, . . . , e + rd . Let a 1 , . . . , a d ∈ F * q be pairwise different elements and let b 1 , . . . , b e ∈ F * q be pairwise different elements. The
Frob evaluates to zero in the d(q − 1) + (q − 1)e − de points
Remark 16. The polytope −H \ −U is not convex, so our method does not determine the privacy threshold t(U ). It would be interesting to examine the methods of [1] on order bounds for toric codes in this context. Figure 3 and with normal fan depicted in Figure 4 .
The primitive generators of the 1-dimensional cones are
, n(ρ 4 ) = 0 −1 .
For i = 1, . . . , 4, the 2-dimensional cones σ i are shown in Figure 4 . The faces of σ 1 are {ρ 1 , ρ 2 }, the faces of σ 2 are {ρ 2 , ρ 3 }, the faces of σ 3 are {ρ 3 , ρ 4 } and the faces of σ 4 are {ρ 4 , ρ 1 }.
The support function of is:
The related toric surface is in general singular as {n(ρ 2 ), n(ρ 3 )} and {n(ρ 3 ), n(ρ 4 )} are not bases for the lattice M . We can desingularize by subdividing the cones σ 2 and σ 3 , however, our calculations will only involve the cones σ 1 and σ 2 , so we refrain from that.
For all pairs of 1-dimensional cones ρ i , ρ j ∈ ∆(1), i = 1, . . . , 4, the intersection numbers (V (ρ i ); V (ρ j )) are determined by the methods of 4.2. We only need the self-intersection number (V (ρ 1 ); V (ρ 1 )), and as
we have that (10) (V (ρ 1 ); V (ρ 1 )) = 0 by the remark following Lemma 11. Let U = M ∩ be the lattice points in . From the toric surfaces constructed from with I 1 = J 2 = F * q × F * q and I 2 = J 1 = ∅ in the notation of Remark 13, we obtain the following result.
Theorem 17. Assume a, b are integers with 0 ≤ b ≤ a ≤ q − 2.
Let be the polytope in M R with vertices (0, 0), (a, 0), (b, q − 2), (0, q − 2) rendered in Figure 3 , and let U = M ∩ be the lattice points in .
i) The maximal number of zeros of π T (Fq) (f ) for f ∈ F q < U > is less than or equal to
ii) The reconstruction threshold r(U ) of the secret sharing scheme M(U ) of Definition 3 satisfies
iii) The privacy threshold t(U ) of the secret sharing scheme M(U ) satisfies
The secret sharing scheme M(U ) has t-strong multiplication for
Proof. Let m 1 = (1, 0). The F q -rational points of T ≃ F q * × F q * belong to the q − 1 lines on X given by
Assume that f is zero along precisely c of these lines. As e(m 1 ) − η and e(m 1 ) have the same divisors of poles, they have equivalent divisors of zeroes, so . This number can be calculated using Lemma 11 using the observation that (e(m 1 )) 0 = V (ρ 1 ). We get from (9) and (10) We obtain iii) by using the result in i) on the polytope (q − 2, q − 2) + − H \ − with vertices (0, 0), (q − 2 − b, 0), (q − 2 − a, q − 2) and (q − 2, q − 2). The maksimum number of zeros of π T (Fq) (g) for g ∈ F q < −H \ −U > is by Lemma 4 and the result in i) less than or equal to (q − 1)
2 − (q − 1 − (q − 2 − b)) = (q − 1) 2 − 1 − b and iii) follows from Theorem 8.
To prove iv) assume t ≤ (q − 2 − 2a) − 1 and t ≤ b − 2. We will use Theorem 9. Consider the Minkowski sum U + U and let V = U + U be its reduction modulo q − 1 as in Corollary 5. Under the assumption 2a ≤ q − 2, we have that V = U + U is the lattice points of the integral convex polytope with vertices (0, 0), (2a, 0), (2b, q − 2) and (0, q − 2).
By the result in i) the maksimum number of zeros of π T (Fq) (h) for h ∈ F q < V > is less than or equal to (q − 1)
2 − (q − 1 − 2a). As the number of players is n = (q − 1) 2 − 1, the right hand side of the condition (1) of Theorem 9 is least (q − 2 − 2a) − 1, which by assumption is at least t.
By assumption t ≤ b − 1 and from iii) we have that b − 1 ≤ t(U ). We conclude that t ≤ t(U ). 
